There has been much ado about a possible Chinese navy base in West Africa. It almost seems more a matter of ‘when’ then a matter of ‘if’. But if China does indeed want a base there, what would be a likely spot? In this article, I focus on 3 Chinese port projects on the Gulf of Guinea and investigate their potential as a military base. The Gulf of Guinea region is of particular importance with widespread concerns over maritime security. The list of worrisome incidents includes piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking, oil theft, and illegal fishing. This matters as it may provide China the reason it needs to build a base: protecting its interests – vessels, companies and citizens – in a perceived hostile environment. The ports discussed are: Port of Bata, Equatorial Guinea. Port of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Port of Lekki, Nigeria.
Military or not
Whether a port is a military facility or not is a question without a clear cut answer. Basically any commercial port can be used by a navy ship for rest and replenishment, if local authorities agree. That alone doesn’t make it a military port. This changes when a commercial port builds facilities specifically for military purposes, like a navy-only terminal, ammunition depots, or barracks. These kinds of commercial-military ports are commonly called ‘dual-purpose ports’. A truly military port is exclusively used by navy ships. These ports usually include military grade radar & communication equipment and defensive structures. China currently operates one such port; in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. China is probably developing a similar facility in Cambodia.
Port building – Objectives
China has several objectives for building ports or port facilities in Africa, and indeed around the world. The main objective is trade, and that has always been so. China is the producer of everything and needs markets. Equally so, it needs resources to produce even more. More ports mean more trade and more profits. Since the reform and opening-up, and in some cases even earlier, China has constantly developed new international trade routes with ports, railways, and roads. This process was accelerated with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013.
A second objective is securing its shipping lanes. China does this in two interlocked ways: by building said ports or port facilities and by expanding the global reach of its navy. Just 20 years ago the PLA Navy would rarely venture out of China’s coastal waters. Nowadays, Chinese navy vessels sail all over the globe. They need a network of friendly ports to replenish and to impress.
The role of Chinese state-owned companies (SEOs) is often misunderstood, simplified, or both. SEOs walk a fine line between earning money and supporting the state’s geopolitical goals. For example, a company can be asked to start operations in a country it doesn’t deem safe, or in a business it doesn’t deem profitable. They will go there nevertheless if the state so wants. On the other hand, the objectives of SEOs and the Chinese state may align perfectly, for example when the Chinese government clears the path to a desired market with closer bilateral relations with a certain country or multilateral relations with a bloc of countries.
Framework
When expanding in Africa, China uses two frameworks: BRI and FOCAC. Generally speaking, BRI is mainly bilateral whereas FOCAC is mainly multilateral.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
BRI was launched in 2013. BRI consists of two main parts that regularly overlap: the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt. Generally speaking, in Africa, port projects are seen as part of the former and large road or rail projects are seen as part of the latter. However, there is overlap where roads meet ports etcetera, so the distinction isn’t very clear. Chinese state media often simply refer to ‘BRI’ when discussing projects in Africa. It is furthermore important to know that many Chinese projects in Africa predate BRI by many years or even decades. These projects have often been retrofitted into the BRI framework. Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria participate in BRI.
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
FOCAC was founded in 2000 in Beijing, and is aimed at expanding Chinese-African cooperation. FOCAC was, and in some cases still is, the main conduit for China’s COVID-assistance to African countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes FOCAC as:
“The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation. The characteristics of the Forum are as follows: Pragmatic Cooperation: Its purpose is to strengthen consultation and expand cooperation and its focus is on cooperation. Equality and Mutual Benefit: It promotes both political dialogue and economic cooperation and trade, with a view to seeking mutual reinforcement and common development.”
Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria are FOCAC members. There is a FOCAC summit every three years, alternating between Beijing and African cities. The latest meeting was held in August 2022 in Dakar, Senegal (The 8th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). FOCAC is a large organization with numerous sub-forums and institutions apparently involved in China-Africa related research.
China’s “Five Nos” policy
This is a policy unveiled by Xi Jinping during the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The Five Nos are:
– No interference in the development paths of individual countries.
– No interference in their internal affairs.
– No imposition of China’s will.
– No attachment of political strings regarding assistance.
– No seeking of selfish political gains in investment and financing cooperation.
At the same conference, China also announced ‘eight initiatives’, a series of plans for 8 fields: Industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development, capacity building, healthcare, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security matters.
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan 2022-2024 （中非合作论坛—达喀尔行动计划（2022-2024)）
A wide ranging plan to expand political and economic cooperation, published at the 8th Ministerial Conference in Dakar. The plan is the successor of the earlier Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021). Subjects range from agriculture to medical care to ‘press and media’. For port building, there are three important articles: Infrastructure Development (3.2), Trade (3.5), Peace and Security Cooperation (6), and Maritime Cooperation (7.2). Each article is further divided into sections. The ones that matter most:
3.2 Infrastructure Development
- 3.2.2: … [China will] support Chinese enterprises in contributing to the improvement and development of Africa’s infrastructure with advanced equipment, technologies, standards and services, promoting connectivity and providing innovative financing.
- 3.2.5: China encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to invest in African ports, airports and airlines. The African side welcomes such investment. Both sides support Chinese and African airlines and shipping companies in opening more flights and shipping services connecting China and Africa.
- 3.2.10: The two sides will … encourage and support their companies in participating and partnering in the building of ICT infrastructure including the optical fiber cable backbone network, cross-border connectivity, international undersea cable, new-generation mobile network, and data center[s].
3.5. Trade
- 3.5.9 Both sides support developing marine-rail-combined transportation such as the “Sichuan-Europe-Africa Service”, to create new trade corridors for China-Africa international land and maritime logistics and trade, and level up two-way trade and logistics cooperation.
- Peace and Security Corporation
- 6.1.1: China and Africa underscore that peace and security in Africa remains an important part of their cooperation, and the two sides will continue to strengthen the implementation of the China-Africa peace and security plan; … The two sides will lay emphasis on defense military capabilities, actively conduct exchanges and cooperation in such fields as military education, military training, military medicine, logistics support, and maritime security … .
- 6.1.2 Both sides will enhance cooperation under the framework of the UN, actively participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, strengthen exchanges on peacekeeping policies and skills, and support Africa’s capacity building for independent peacekeeping missions.
- 6.1.3 China and Africa will continue to support African capacity building, and advance the implementation of new measures for the China-Africa Peace and Security Plan, to fill the gap between the mandate and the capacities of African forces. China will undertake 10 peace and security assistance projects for Africa, continue to deliver military assistance to the African Union, support African countries’ efforts to independently maintain regional security and fight terrorism, and conduct joint exercises and on-site training between Chinese and African peacekeeping troops and cooperation on small arms and light weapons control.
7.2. Maritime Cooperation
- 7.2.3 The two sides will strengthen exchanges and cooperation between sea ports. China will provide technical assistance and support for relevant plans for the marine industry of African countries, support African countries in advancing IT development and application in African sea ports, and step up cooperation with Africa on blue economy.
- 7.2.4 China will, under the principle of sincerity, equality, mutual benefit and win-win results, carry out cooperation with African countries in such fields as maritime scientific research, ocean observation and monitoring, marine eco-environmental protection, and Antarctic research and logistics support, advance the building of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and make positive contributions to global marine governance.
- 7.2.5 The two sides will continue to strengthen cooperation and exchanges on, among others, offshore aquaculture, maritime transportation, shipbuilding and repair, offshore wind power, maritime information services and maritime security.
While this plan is more about intentions than concrete steps, it does give a clear idea of the general direction that China wants to go in Africa. It is notable that the text explicitly mentions communication networks, including undersea cables. A typical BRI injection is the idea to develop a marine-rail transport link. There is an active focus on China supporting Africa’s armies, for fighting terrorism, and for joint peacekeeping programs. China intends to provide strong support for the maritime sector, with ports, shipyards, and even offshore aquaculture. Notable is the paragraph about scientific research, with ocean observation and “Antarctic research and logistics support”. China’s ice breakers have stopped in South Africa for replenishment many times, and China may be looking for other ports to support its Antarctic program.
Whereas the text doesn’t mention a Chinese base, it is hard to imagine how China can carry out all these activities without some sort of a permanent post. The China-Africa Peace and Security Plan refers to a $60 million grant, agreed on in 2015, from China to the African Union (AU) for a “African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis”. The intention is that this force will become a regional peacekeeping force under the AU. This is especially significant as other plans for an AU role in local security crisis have come to nothing.
China is clearly pushing this idea. In July 2022, the Second China-Africa Peace and Security Forum was held online, with “nearly 50 ministerial leaders” and AU representatives in attendance. The meeting was chaired by China’s always active Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe, who stated: “The two sides should intensify strategic communication, strengthen cooperation in equipment and technology, deepen joint maritime exercises and training, and expand exchanges in professional fields, so as to promote China-Africa peace and security cooperation to deepen and solidify.”
Going closer to the area at hand: two months earlier, in May 2022, the Chinese military organized a “Seminar on the Security Situation in the Gulf of Guinea”. The theme of the meeting was “Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea from the Perspective of a Community with a Shared Future at Sea”. It was chaired by China’s navy commander admiral Dong Jun and attended by the commanders of the navies and coast guards of countries around the Gulf of Guinea. The seminar discussed two topics: “Maintaining the Security and Development of the Gulf of Guinea: The Role and Actions of Maritime Power” and “New Vision for China-Africa Maritime Security Cooperation”.
The various plans and meetings show a clear Chinese strategy of engagement with countries, organizations, and navies in Africa and more specifically around the Gulf of Guinea. China does regularly emphasize the role it sees for the African Union, but that may be more window dressing than actual intentional cooperation.
Ivory Coast
China and Ivory Coast established economic relations in 1983. Relations are good. China has an embassy in the economic capital Abidjan, in a heavy walled compound with a notably large amount of satcom equipment. Trade between countries is small. In 2020, China exported $2.33 billion to Ivory Coast and imported $518 million. Main export products were pesticides, coated flat-rolled iron, and non-fillet frozen fish. Main import products were rubber, manganese ore, and crude petroleum.
Port of Abidjan (CIAB)
The Port of Abidjan is an important hub in China’s trade with Western Africa. The Port of Abidjan is overseen by the Abidjan Port Authority. The various terminals are operated by various companies. For example, the container port is operated by a company called Abidjan Terminal.
In 2020, the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) completed the ‘Abidjan Autonomous Port Expansion and Modernization Project’. The work started in 2015. Total investment was $933.4 million. This was financed by a $793.4 million loan from the state-owned Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) and a EUR 250 million bridge loan facility from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). The expansion project included a the enlargement of the Vridi canal, a new container terminal, a roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) terminal, and a general-cargo berth.
CHEC is a subsidiary of state-owned China Communication Construction Company (CCCC). CHEC is an important BRI player with subsidiaries and projects in dozens of countries in Africa, Asia, and South-America.
Also in 2020, CHEC started a separate $470.4 million project, building a new container terminal called Côte d’Ivoire Terminal (CIT). This terminal is scheduled to start operations just about when you read this, on November 1, 2022. CIT is owned and operated by a joint venture between French Bolloré Logistics and Dutch-Danish APM Terminals. The terminal is projected to handle 1.5 million TEU containers annually. Maximum draught is 16 meters. According to APM, it is the only container terminal in West Africa able to handle ships of up to 14.000 TUE with a max length of 350 meters The terminal positions itself as a gateway for nearby landlocked countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Total investment was $392 million.
The gantry cranes for this terminal are from China as well. They were manufactured by cranemaker Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC), another subsidiary of CCCC. ZPMC has its European headquarters in Rotterdam. The cranes were shipped from China with two of ZPMC’s own ships; the Zhenhua 24 and the Zhenhua 35.
CHEC is also involved in the extension of the port of San Pedro (CISPY), the second-largest port of Ivory Coast. An agreement for the expansion was signed in 2018. In late September 2022, Ivory Coast announced that it had awarded CHEC a $38.5 million deal to build the ‘Akwaba interchange’ near the Félix-Houphouët-Boigny International Airport (ABJ). This interchange is part of the much larger Greater Abidjan Port City Integration Project.
There are two notable power projects going on nearby the ports as well: In 2018, Ivory Coast announced it had awarded two Chinese companies with the construction of two power stations: a 372-megawatt gas-power station in Abidjan to China Energy Engineering Corporation and a 500-megawatt coal-powered station in San Pedro to Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina). However, the former project has been delayed numerous times and the latter project was suspended in 2021 after local protests and after China pledged it would no longer finance coal-powered power stations abroad.
The Ivory Coast navy has bases in Abidjan, San Pedro and Adiake. The Abidjan base is located about 4 kilometers northwest of the China-made terminals. The navy operates one China-made vessel, a 27-meter patrol boat donated by China in 2017. The donation included training and naval repair equipment. The Ivory Coast Air Force hasn’t got any Chinese equipment. The air force does have a base at Félix-Houphouët-Boigny International Airport. This base is located about 14 kilometer by road to the southwest of the China-made terminals. The army has at least 12 new Chinese WZ-551 6×6 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), first displayed during a military parade in August 2022.
Suitable for a military base – report
| Nearby naval bases (host country) | Yes |
| Nearby airport | Yes |
| Nearby Chinese built infrastructure | Some |
| Suitable for larger navy ships | Yes |
| Chinese ownership of port/terminals | No |
| Are Chinese-build terminals used for military purposes by the host nation |
No |
| Likelihood of a CHN base | Small |
China is heavily involved in port construction in Abidjan and, to a lesser extent, in San Pedro. However, the terminals and other facilities constructed by China are not directly owned or operated by Chinese entities. There is some Chinese infrastructure around Abidjan but no direct Chinese involvement in the airport or the road/railroad network. This may change if Chinese companies get a bigger share of the Greater Abidjan Port City Integration Project. The power projects would give China considerably more sway but these projects are either delayed or suspended at the moment. The Ivory Coast army uses only a small amount of Chinese equipment but the recent purchase of modern IFVs is notable. For now, the chances of a Chinese naval base in Abidjan seem remote.
Equatorial Guinea
China and Equatorial Guinea established economic relations in 1983. Relations are good. China has an embassy in the capital Malabo, located in an embassy area in the north of town. Trade between countries is uneven. In 2020, China exported only $122 million to Equatorial Guinea, but it imported $1.01 billion. Main export products were ceramic bricks, plastic building materials, and rubber footwear. Main import products were crude petroleum, rough wood, and petroleum gas.
Port of Bata (GQBSG)
Equatorial Guinea made headlines in 2021 when US officials suggested that China intended to establish a naval base at the port of Bata, a major transport hub and the country’s largest city. The US hasn’t shown any clear evidence of this intention. China has not officially denied or confirmed the suggestions, but opinion pieces in state media do seem to confirm China is at least looking into the possibility of building bases in Africa. For example, an opinion article published in January 2022 in the Global Times says: “Despite China’s prudence in building such bases, more training and support bases are needed to maintain peace and China’s overseas interests, since China has invested and will invest more in the African continent.”
The port was built by China’s First Harbor Engineering Company(CCC-FHEC). The port was then upgraded by the China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC), in a project that ran from 2009 until 2014.
CCC-FHEC and CRBC are both subsidiaries of state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), just like aforementioned CHEC. They play a major role in BRI, with projects in Central Asia, Africa, and Europe.
The port of Bata is divided into two parts: The northern part with a ferry pier and a general pier, and the southern part with two large cargo piers. The maximum drought is 11.5 meters. Bata appears to be a reasonably busy port, with about a dozen ships in port every day and 3-5 under way. Most of these vessels are container ships and tankers. The port is operated by the Administración de Puertos de Guinea Ecuatorial (APGE). The gantry cranes came from China too, made again by ZPMC. The cranes were shipped from China with one of ZPMC’s own ships; the Zhenhua 35. Both this ship and the aforementioned Zhenhua 24 have regularly sailed from China to Africa with all sorts of heavy cranes.
Besides the port, there is other notable Chinese activity in the area. Telecom company Huawei Marine Networks built the 290 kilometer Ceiba-2 Submarine Cable System, running from Bata to Malabo with a branche to Kribi, Cameroon. The cable is operated by GITGE, a company that manages Equatorial Guinea’s telecom infrastructure. Bata is also a landing point for the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable, connecting the west coast of Africa with Europe.
Huawei Marine Networks (HMN) was a joint venture between Huawei Technologies and British Global Marine Group (GMG). However, in 2019 Huawei Technologies sold its stake in the joint venture to China’s Hengtong Group (HTGD). One year later, GMG sold its shares to HTGD as well. The company was subsequently renamed to HMN Technologies.
HTGD is a large cable manufacturer and communications company based in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. In 2021, the U.S. added several Hengtong companies to its Entity List, including the remnants of HMN. If a foreign party (company, university, R&D) is on the Entity List, U.S. companies are not allowed to export, re-export, or transfer items to that party without a special license.
In early 2022, the Equatorial Guinea government announced plans for the establishment of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Bata. This was a follow-up of an earlier 2019 plan for such a zone, which involved the Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE). SCE is a state-development agency under the Singaporean ministries of trade and foreign affairs with many projects in Africa. The possibilities of an SEZ were also discussed during a visit by Chinese development banks to Equatorial Guinea in 2019. Whether Chinese entities will be involved in the eventual construction of the zone is yet unknown.
The Navy of Equatorial Guinea has one China-made vessel (No. 106), a 4000 ton landing ship commissioned in 2010. The ship was built in China and outfitted and armed in Ukraine. It was based in Bata earlier but it is currently moored to the north of Caribe on Boko Island. One of the navy’s two Bulgarian-made PV50 class patrol ships is based in Bata. The main naval base is near the capital Malabo on Boko Island, some 245 kilometers to the northwest of Bata. The army and air force do not use any significant Chinese equipment.
Bata International Airport (BSG) is located about 12 kilometers to the northeast of the port of Bata. It is used for both military aviation and civil aviation. At least four Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters are based on the south side of the airport. BSG was used extensively in the aftermath of a large explosion on an army base in Bata that killed at least 105 in March 2021. Several countries send military transport airplanes with relief goods. Qatar, for example, send four C-17A Globemaster IIIs.
Suitable for a military base – report
| Nearby naval bases (host country) | No |
| Nearby airport | Yes |
| Nearby Chinese built infrastructure | Yes |
| Suitable for larger navy ships | Yes |
| Chinese ownership of port/terminals | No |
| Are Chinese-build terminals used for military purposes by the host nation |
Yes |
| Likelihood of a CHN base | Large |
US officials may be on to something: China could have a base in Equatorial Guinea but it seems unlikely they are actually building one right now. China has built and upgraded the Port of Bata but it does not directly own any terminals or other infrastructure in the port. The Equatorial Guinea navy uses Bata as a secondary port and various navy ships are either based or regularly stay at Bata. There is a nearby civilian airport that doubles as an airforce base and has proven to be able to receive large military transport aircraft. The undersea cables make Bata an extra interesting proposition for China; one that it built and one that it may eavesdrop on. The possible creation of an SEZ may get Chinese even more involved in the port and the surrounding area.
Nigeria
China and Nigeria established diplomatic relations in 1971. Relations are very good. China has an embassy in the capital Abuja, located in an embassy area in the east of town, not far from Nigeria’s Ministry of Defense. Trade between countries is large yet uneven. In 2020, China exported $17.4 billion to Nigeria and imported $2.54 billion. Main export products were woven fabric, non-knit women’s suits, and telephones. Main import products are crude petroleum, crude petroleum gas, and raw copper.
Lekki (NGLKK)
The Lekki Deep Sea Port (Lekki Port) is seen in China as “one of the most valuable assets” under BRI in West Africa. It is the largest China-funded deep-water port project in West Africa. The port is located in the Lagos Free Zone (LFZ) in Lagos state, some 65 kilometers to the east of Lagos city. Construction started in 2017. The $1.5 billion port is developed as a “multi-product and logistics hub” for the West African region. The project’s main financier is the China Development Bank (CDB) and the main constructor is the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC).
When fully completed in early 2023, the port will have a container terminal with three berths, a dry bulk terminal, and a liquid bulk terminal. The main quay is 1500 meter long with a water depth of 16.5 meters. The container terminal is designed to handle 2.7 million to TEUs per year. The project includes a navigation channel, an approach channel, a turning basin, and two breakwater structures. China also constructed and delivered various secondary infrastructure for the port, including water supply, wastewater treatment, a communications network, a 30 MW power plant, and of course the gantry cranes.
The port is operated by a company called Lekki Port LFTZ Enterprise Limited (LPLEL). This is a joint venture between Lekki Port Investment Holdings, the Lagos State Government, and the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA). The NPA is a government agency that controls, governs, and operates Nigeria’s ports. NPA has granted LPLEL a concession for 45 years to operate the Lekki Deep Sea Port. So basically, NPA grants this concession partially to itself.
Lekki Port Investment Holdings jointly owned by CHEC and the Singaporean Tolaram Group. The Tolaram Group is a family-controlled conglomerate with activities in consumer goods, fintech, and infrastructure. The Tolaram Group focuses mainly on Asia and Africa. In Nigeria, it also operates the Lagos Free Zone (where Lekki Port is based) and logistics company BHN.
Traffic at the port appears to be slow at any day, with just a few ships in port or on their way. This is especially so compared to the nearby port of Lagos, with regularly some 70 ships in port and dozens on the way. Construction activities in Lekki appear to be ongoing, with Chinese-flagged dredgers operating in the area.
Besides the port, there are other notable Chinese activities in the area. The main Chinese project is the Lagos–Kano Standard Gauge Railway, a 1,343 kilometers railroad connecting Lagos with Kano, a city and trade hub close to the border with Niger. The railway is constructed by state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCEECC) and is largely completed. The communication system for the railway is provided by China’s ZTE. There are no indications of plans for a connection to Lekki.
The Nigerian Navy has two China-made corvettes (F91 and F92, delivered in 2015 and 2016) of the P18N class (Type 056). These ships are usually based at or near the Western Naval Command HQ in Lagos, some 75 kilometers west of Lekki Port. In September 2002, the navy took delivery of four CHRDI-AVIC ship-borne AR-500B helicopter UAVs.
The Nigerian Air Force uses Chinese Chengdu F-7 fighters and Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder multi-role combat aircraft. These aircraft are usually based on Makurdi Air Base, some 520 kilometers north east of Lekki. The air force furthermore operates at least twelve Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). These are mainly deployed against insurgency and armed banditry in the country’s northeast and northwest.
Closer to Lekki Port are an army base on Lagos Island and an air force base at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport. The former is about 65 km from the port and the latter about 75. There is no sight of China-made weaponry at these facilities. The air force base operates mainly transport aircraft and includes the ‘Presidential Wing Murtala Mohammed Airport’, a special area used for government and VIP flights.
Suitable for a military base – report
| Nearby naval bases (host country) | No |
| Nearby airport | Yes |
| Nearby Chinese built infrastructure | Yes |
| Suitable for larger navy ships | Yes |
| Chinese ownership of port/terminals | Yes |
| Are Chinese-build terminals used for military purposes by the host nation |
No |
| Likelihood of a CHN base | Medium |
The Port of Lekki seems very suitable for a Chinese military base. The port is largely constructed by a Chinese company that also partially owns the port. There are several Nigerian military bases nearby and the Nigerian army uses a substantial amount of Chinese weapons. Finally, another Chinese company is in the final stages of completing an important railroad in the vicinity. However, the Port of Lekki has a clear commercial goal and there are no indications of any military use by the host nation, now or in the future. Furthermore, other than smaller countries like Ivory Coast or Equatorial Guinea, a large and relatively wealthy country like Nigeria will likely have less incentives to host a Chinese base. On the contrary, it probably prefers to stay out of any trouble.
Final words
A comparison of just three Chinese-built ports/terminals shows once more how much and how fast China is building new infrastructure in Africa. The primary objective of the ports appears to be commercial, focused on trade with China and on facilitating trade with other nearby countries.
A secondary objective may very well be military. Considering China’s plans with BRI, FOCAC, and with various security initiatives, it seems highly likely that China is at least thinking about establishing a military base. Initially, such a base may be billed as a training facility for African peacekeepers or as a supply station for future anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Guinea.
Of the three ports discussed, Bata seems a plausible candidate to host a Chinese naval base. But these three ports are just… three ports. China is developing many more port and infrastructure projects along the entire west coast of the African continent. Any of these may be an even better option for Chinese military planning.
To be continued, as always.
You can find a shorter redacted version of this article on the Netherlands Atlantic Association.